Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational. Except for highly special classes of games, e.g., the class of dominance solvable games, game theory requires commonly known game rules which comprise all strategically relevant information 2 like the strategy sets, the payoffs as well as the beliefs of all players. If any such aspect is uncertain or ambiguous, one usually transforms such uncertainty into uncertainty resulting from more or less partially observable, fictitious chance moves whose probabilities, reflecting individual uncertainties, are assumed to be commonly known (Harsanyi, 1967 / 8). Common knowledge of the rules of game is extremely unlikely. One often does not know one's own goals; how can one be sure what motivates others? Nevertheless, most applications assume commonly known rules of game without even mentioning or at least trying to justify this assumption. . 1 In dominance solvable games all players have a unique (weakly) undominated strategy like, e.g., in prisoners' dilemma games or random price mechanisms (Becker et al., 1963).
. Introduction

1
Except for highly special classes of games, e.g., the class of dominance solvable games, game theory requires commonly known game rules which comprise all strategically relevant information 2 like the strategy sets, the payoffs as well as the beliefs of all players. If any such aspect is uncertain or ambiguous, one usually transforms such uncertainty into uncertainty resulting from more or less partially observable, fictitious chance moves whose probabilities, reflecting individual uncertainties, are assumed to be commonly known (Harsanyi, 1967 / 8) . Common knowledge of the rules of game is extremely unlikely. One often does not know one's own goals; how can one be sure what motivates others? Nevertheless, most applications assume commonly known rules of game without even mentioning or at least trying to justify this assumption.
In auction theory, the second-price private value auction (Vickrey, 1961) is, for instance, dominance solvable. Studies of other auction types, however, assume commonly known beliefs concerning the values of others for the (unique) indivisible object. The same applies to auction experiments (see Kagel, 1995) . In auction experiments one usually determines all valuations randomly 3 and informs all participants about the probabilities governing such random moves. In actual auctions such information about the beliefs of other bidders is very unlikely. Thus, experiments without commonly known beliefs are very much needed.
We report experimental results of two-bidder private value auctions where both bidders know that their valuations are positive and independent but not how they are randomly determined. These results will be compared with those of an auction experiment with similarly determined random values but known probabilities. Clearly, such a comparison allows to assess the effects of commonly known 4 beliefs. Since the usual a priori-symmetry of bidders, implied by the iid-assumption in auction theory, could encourage a false consensus-effect (others' values are like mine, see Engelmann and Strobel, 2000) it is essential to study an asymmetric auction. Guth et al. (2001) have already explored experimentally an asymmetric two-bidder auction, solved game theoretically by Plum (1992) and Kalkofen and Plum (1996) . In the new experiment we do not provide any information how values are randomly generated, neither for the own nor for the other's 5 value.
. The former and the new experimental design
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bidder 2 with the more favorable valuation bids pointwise less than bidder 1. Furthermore, the first-price auction is inefficient since it happens with positive probability that the bidder with the 7 s lower valuation wins the auction. The second-price auction is incentive-compatible so that b (v ) 5 v ,
for i 5 1,2 and therefore efficient. 3 Since beliefs are subjective a participant may, of course, entertain beliefs which differ from the experimentally controlled probabilities. This illustrates that in experiments one can try to control subjective factors but never guarantee them. 4 In the private value-case the iid-assumption means that all private values are independently determined by an identical and independent chance move (distribution). 5 The experimental instructions simply define the payoff for a given value and do not explain how this value is determined. If a participant asked for the way of determining the value, we would have simply answered 'You do not know this'. In fact the question was never asked by the subjects. 6 For a more general analysis in a similar framework see Maskin and Riley (2000 We only repeated the first phase of the former experiment consisting of four cycles with 12 bidding rounds each. In a cycle the first(second) six rounds were first(second)-price auctions with newly generated values and randomly assigned partners in each round. We use the instructions of the old experiment except for the part informing subjects about the value ranges for both bidders and the equal probability of all these integers. Instead it was only mentioned that ''values are positive and determined for each bidder independently and by chance''. The new experiment uses the same random sequences of values v , respectively, v and the matching protocol of the former experiment. Participants were, of course, not aware of this. We also made sure that no subject participated in both 10 experiments. In this way we repeated five (of the eight) sessions of the former study. Tables 1 and 2 Based on session averages the null hypothesis of equal efficiency E for both experiments cannot be rejected (P $ 0.548, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided, for both auction types and all cycles). The same is true for the prices in the first price auction. In the second-price auction the prices in the WO experiment are significantly lower at the 5% level for bidders with experience (cycles 3 and 4).
. The effects of commonly known beliefs
The similarly arranged Table 3 theoretical bids, where we additionally distinguish between bidder types, weak and strong. In the case 11 of the first-price auction D is naturally positive. As theoretically predicted the weak bidder bids more aggressively than the strong bidder, i.e., underbids less. In the second-price auction D should be zero and may therefore turn out negative. Whereas in the WO experiment underbidding slightly increases in the first-price auction for both bidder types, there is almost no overbidding on average in the second-price auction. But again the null hypothesis of no differences between the two experiments cannot be rejected for all cycles of the first-price auction and for the first three cycles of the second-price auction (P $ 0.06). For the last cycle of the second-price auction the differences (nearly no overbidding of bidder 1, underbidding by bidder 2 in case of WO compared to substantial overbidding by both in case of W ) are significant for both bidders (MWU at the 5% level). The lack of commonly known beliefs crowds out the rather robust overbidding in second-price sealed-bid experiments (see, e.g., Kagel and Levin, 1993; Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel, 1995) . Table 4 lists the average earnings of the bidders. Despite the systematically slightly higher profits in the WO experiment for both bidder types none of the observed differences is significant P $ 0.1 . s d Altogether we hardly ever observe significant differences between the two experiments suggesting no 12 or rather minor effects of commonly known beliefs. If at all the minor effects render behavior more equilibrium-like with experience.
Our main result is that the common knowledge assumption changes behavior only slightly and hardly ever in significant ways. For the applicability of game theory this seems to be rather comforting: although commonly known beliefs are rather unlikely, the results do not seem to depend much on this assumption. However, this suggests that bounded rational bidders do not engage in game theoretic reasoning. More specifically, it seems that information about beliefs hardly matters for the way how they decide.
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